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In a classic paper, Brennan and Clark argued that when interlocutors agree on a name
for an object, they are forming a temporary agreement on how to conceptualize that
object; that is, they are forming a conceptual pact. The literature on conceptual pacts
has largely focused on the costs and benefits of breaking and maintaining lexical
precedents, and the degree to which they might be partner-specific. The research
presented here focuses on a question about conceptual pacts that has been largely
neglected in the literature: To what extent are conceptual pacts specific to the local
context of the interaction? If conceptual pacts are indeed temporary, then when
the local context changes in ways that are accessible to participants, we would
expect participants to seamlessly shift to referential expressions that reflect novel
conceptualizations. Two experiments examined how referential forms change across
context in collaborative, task-oriented dialog between naïve participants. In Experiment
1, names for parts of an unknown object were established in an “item” identification
stage (e.g., a shape that looked like a wrench was called “the wrench”). In a second
“build” stage, that name was often supplanted by an object-oriented name, e.g., the
“leg.” These changes happened abruptly and without negotiation. In Experiment 2,
interlocutors manipulated clip art and more abstract tangram pictures in a “slider” puzzle
to arrange the objects into a target configuration. On some trials moving an object
revealed a picture that could be construed as a contrast competitor, e.g., a clip art
picture of a camel after “the camel” had been negotiated as a name for a tangram
shape, or vice versa. As would be expected, modification rates increased when a
potential contrast was revealed. More strikingly, the degree to which a name had been
negotiated or the frequency with which it had been used did not affect the likelihood that
the revealed shape would be considered as a potential contrast. We find little evidence
that names that are introduced as part of a conceptual pact persist when either the
task goals or informational needs change. Rather, conceptual pacts are fluid temporary
agreements.
Keywords: referential expressions, conceptual pacts, entrenchment, targeted language game, interactive
conversation
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 April 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 561
fpsyg-07-00561 April 25, 2016 Time: 14:53 # 2
Ibarra and Tanenhaus The Flexibility of Conceptual Pacts
INTRODUCTION
There is a many-to-many mapping between names and potential
referents. A picture of a Bernese Mountain Dog could be referred
to as “the dog”, “the Bernese Mountain Dog,” “the Berner,”
etc. Furthermore, names can be assigned on the basis of the
properties of the object (e.g., “the brown dog”), assigned with
respect to a particular referential domain (e.g., “the big dog”
when there is a small one as well), or assigned with respect to
a referential domain that is tied to a local goal. For example,
when completing a jigsaw puzzle, “try the red piece,” might be
uttered—and easily understood—in a collaborative task, when
there are several pieces that might fit and several other red pieces
that are clearly the wrong size and shape (Brown-Schmidt and
Tanenhaus, 2008). A central question, then, in both reference
generation and comprehension is how interlocutors choose a
specific referential expression and then modify its use as a
discourse unfolds.
In a classic paper, Brennan and Clark (1996) introduced
the notion of a conceptual pact. Building on the foundation
established by Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) and Isaacs
and Clark (1987) in developing the collaborative model of
conversation, Brennan and Clark argued against what they
termed “a historical” accounts of the generation of referring
expressions. They proposed that when participants agree upon
a name, that is when the name has been grounded, they are
making a temporary agreement about how to conceptualize that
object. The aspect of conceptual pacts that has received the most
attention in recent years is the claim that conceptual pacts are
partner-specific. For example, there is an ongoing debate about
how and when the use of a particular name for an object will affect
processing, specifically when an established name (a maintained
precedent) or a different name (a broken precedent) is used by
the same partner or by a different partner (see Kronmüller and
Barr, 2015 for a recent review and meta-analysis).
The current research focuses on an important aspect of
conceptual pacts that has been largely ignored in the literature.
In comparing their proposal with pioneering work by Carroll
(1980, also see Carroll, 1985), Brennan and Clark noted that a
defining characteristic of their model is that conceptual pacts
are temporary and adaptable. They argued that participants can
modify their utterances abruptly, that is without negotiation
in response to changing goals and informational needs. Thus
when the interlocutors’ goals change or when the informational
demands of the local context change, then the pressure to adhere
to a conceptual pact might be relatively weak. If that is the
case, then elucidating these factors will be crucial to developing
robust theories of reference generation and understanding. Here
we ask (1) whether interlocutors do indeed abruptly change
their referential expressions–in particular negotiated names–
when either the goals or informational demands change; and
(2) whether frequent use of a name in a conceptual pact causes
the name to become entrenched, that is resistant to being
changed.
Given the focus in the literature on the benefits of maintaining
precedents and the costs of breaking precedents, Brennan
and Clark’s (1996) evidence for conceptual pacts becoming
entrenched is arguably quite weak. They found that when
interlocutors used a subordinate-level name because a picture
was introduced in the context of another member of the same
category (e.g., a collie in the context of two dogs), they often
continued to use that name rather than the more basic-level name
(e.g., “dog”). This can be viewed as a form of over-modification,
which is quite common (see Pogue et al., 2016).
Conversely, the evidence for the flexibility of conceptual pacts
is also relatively weak. Brennan and Clark (1996) found that
after using a basic-level name, such as “shoe,” interlocutors would
switch to a subordinate level category, e.g., “penny loafer” when
confronted by a situation in which there was more than one type
of shoe. In this situation each of the potential referents would
be an equally good fit to the previous referential description of
“shoe.” Moreover, changing the name from a basic-level category
name to a subordinate-level name does not require a major shift
in conceptualization.
If a grounded name reflects a temporary agreement to
conceptualize an object in a particular way with respect to
a particular set of goals and informational needs, then when
the goals or informational needs change, participants will no
longer seek to use previously grounded referring expressions. The
current research was designed to test this claim using stronger
manipulations than those used by Brennan and Clark (1996).
In Experiment 1, we introduce a change in the goal structure
of a collaborative task that could potentially trigger a bigger
shift in conceptualization in order to see whether or speakers
will make non-negotiated, abrupt changes in their use of a
referring expression. In Experiment 2 we introduce a change in
the referential context by introducing a new object that could be
treated as contrastive or not, depending on whether participants
choose to maintain a previous conceptual pact.
Both experiments use “targeted language games” (Brown-
Schmidt and Tanenhaus, 2008; Tanenhaus and Brown-Schmidt,
2008) with task-oriented dialog. In most experimental work on
naming, the referential domain depends primarily on a fixed
set of potential referents, with little or no collaboration and
minimal task constraints (e.g., Nadig and Sedivy, 2002; Sedivy,
2003; Brown-Schmidt and Tanenhaus, 2006; Engelhardt et al.,
2006; Brown-Schmidt and Konopka, 2008). Thus there are no
changes in either the goals or informational demands that might
lead participants to abandon previously established conceptual
pacts.
In task-oriented dialog, however, interlocutors work together
to establish a given name in order to uniquely identify a referent
with respect to goals, which might be hierarchically arranged.
Therefore the language is unscripted and the referential domains
are likely to be more fluid than in studies using other tasks.
An example of how task constraints and local goals can
modulate referential domains comes from a study by Brown-
Schmidt and Tanenhaus (2008). In their study, two participants
who could not see one another collaborated to match place
pieces on their respective DuploTM pegged boards such that
the boards would match. Participants had identical boards that
were divided into several sub-regions defined by cardboard
borders. Additionally, participants had stickers covering the
pegs on the board indicating the type of block (e.g., color
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and shape) that was to be placed in that particular location;
where one participant had a sticker, the other participant’s board
was blank. Brown-Schmidt and Tanenhaus analyzed utterances
in which one of the participants referred to a block when
there was a potential competitor referent in the same sub-
region (e.g., a red, vertical block, when there was another
red block, like a red horizontal block). Whereas one might
expect speakers to use referential expressions that would take
into account all of the potential referents, more than 50%
of there referential descriptions were “under-informative,” For
example, the speaker might say “Put it above the red block.”
Surprisingly, these potentially ambiguous referring expressions
were not confusing to the addressee. When the task constraints
were factored in, these “under-informative” referring expressions
did in fact uniquely identify a single block, (e.g., only one
of the red blocks had enough space above it to put another
object). The goal of placing blocks in particular configurations
thus restricted the referential domain to only those that
fit.
We explore two hypotheses about the context-dependence
of conceptual pacts. The first hypothesis is that a conceptual
pact is specific to a task goal. The strongest form of this
hypothesis is that when the goal changes, interlocutors will
neither seek to maintain, nor avoid breaking, lexical precedents.
The second hypothesis is that participants will no longer be
bound by prior conceptual pacts whenever there is a change
in the potential informational demands. We assess this by
introducing new objects that could be named in different
ways to see if participants seek to generate a referential
description that would allow them to maintain a lexical
precedent.
EXPERIMENT 1: CONCEPTUAL PACTS
AMID SHIFTING GOALS
In Experiment 1 we created a situation in which two interlocutors
who could not see each other’s work areas collaborated to build
a three-dimensional puzzle of an animal. The partners’ task
was divided into two phases. In the first phase, participants
retrieved and named relevant puzzle pieces (abstract shapes)
from a larger set using instructional cards as a guide. Each
card showed a picture of an object that would be needed later.
Participants had no knowledge of the end goal of the puzzle.
In the second phase, participants used those pieces to build the
animal puzzle. We focused on whether the shift in goal from
picking out abstract objects from a set to the assembly of an
animal would predict a change in references to objects with
previously grounded referring expressions. We asked whether an
abstract object referred to by a grounded name (e.g., the wrench)
would be referred to by a different, object-based name (e.g., the
leg) when the goal is shifted, and if so, whether the change in
name would need to be negotiated or even commented on by the
interlocutors (e.g., “the wrench is a leg”). We also hoped to find
cases where that piece did not fit (e.g., the piece referred to as “the
leg” wouldn’t fit) in order to see whether participants would then
reuse the negotiated name.
Materials and Methods
We created a turn-taking language task designed to elicit
repeated reference to a specific set of objects. The design is a
subset of a larger paradigm used in studies assessing linguistic
convergence and miscommunication (Roche et al., 2013; Paxton
et al., 2014). The participants’ overall task was to build three-
dimensional puzzles using pictorial instruction cards. The task
constrained both the objects requiring linguistic reference and
the order in which they were to be manipulated, but participants
were otherwise able to speak freely. In addition, a barrier was
introduced so that there was no shared visual space, thereby
necessitating that using spoken language was the primary means
of communication (e.g., shifts in gaze or point could not be
used as cues). Turns were implemented rigidly, as instructions
were staggered across the two instruction stacks, one for each
participant and both of which made up the full set of instructions.
These were ordered to ensure successful alternation of turns.
Stimuli included three BlocoTM animal puzzles, consisting of
a grasshopper, lion and lizard (see Figure 1 for final product)
and order of objects was counterbalanced across participants. The
number of instructions varied between the objects (total range:
17–32 instruction cards; see Table 1 for a breakdown; see Figure 2
for sample instruction cards).
FIGURE 1 | BlocoTM objects: grasshopper, lizard, lion.
TABLE 1 | Number of instruction cards for each animal, total and by phase.
Object Total instructions Item phase Build phase
Lizard 17 9 8
Grasshopper 23 10 13
Lion 32 15 17
FIGURE 2 | Sample item phase instruction card (left) and build phase
instruction card (right) for lizard.
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Task: Phase Structure
To create a situation in which repeated reference to the same
objects would occur across two different contexts by virtue of a
shift in task, separate phases were introduced: the item phase and
the build phase. In the item phase, participants picked out the
individual pieces needed to build the object. Both participants
were given identical sets of pieces in a bin. During a turn, each
participant would pick out the piece on her card from her bin and
then describe the object so that her partner could do the same.
Instructions alternated until the proper subset of items had been
selected. Note that the identity of the object to be built was not
given until the item phase was complete.
Once the item phase was complete and the participants had
matching pieces on their workspaces, the build phase began.
During the build phase, participants also alternated instructions,
with each instruction card describing how to build a combination
of those pieces obtained in the item phase; these were ordered
and staggered to establish turn taking. Crucially, these pieces
were to be combined and then added onto a pre-constructed
object—an unfinished animal body. The unfinished animal body
was presented at the beginning of the build phase in order to
emphasize the shift in task. In the item phase, we expected
participants were likely to uniquely identify pieces relative to the
set of alternatives in the bin. In the build phase, we expected that
participants would refer to pieces relative to their relationship to
the build-object, especially once its structure began to emerge.
For both phases, participants were video-recorded and the
audio was extracted to fully transcribe the participants’ dialog.
Transcriptions were then coded with the following annotations.
Annotations
Discourse features:
(1) Speaker identity: the identity of the speaker at any given
turn.
(2) Local shifts in task: tracking of trial; each instruction card
representing a trial, constrained by task and specific object.
(3) Global shifts in task: tracking of phase; either item or build.
Features of referential expression:
(1) Referent: the object being referred to by the referential
expression.
(2) Groundedness: presence of grounding expression following
referential expression.
Fine-grained: classed individually as “mhm,” “yup,” “yeah,”
“yes,” “okay,” “alright.”
Course-grained: classed as “mhm,” “yup,” “yeah,” “yes,”
“okay,” “alright.”
(3) Definiteness of description: presence of a definite article
preceding description.
(4) Distance from previous mention: number of turns between
repeated references to same object, semi-constrained by
task.
(5) Noun phrase head: head noun of referential expression.
(6) “Like” complement: referential expression following a “like”
construction, most commonly a “looks like” construction.
Outcome Variables
The variable of interest was a change of a referential form, as
realized in the repeated reference of any given puzzle piece. This
was operationalized as a change in the head noun of a referring
expression.
Secondarily, the specific type of change was explored, with
any given change categorized as either a negotiated change or
an abrupt change. We operationalized negotiated changes as
those referential expressions whose changed form was introduced
obliquely in prior discourse but not as the head noun. Because
these often were the complements of constructions such as “looks
like a wrench,” this was the only linguistic construction used to
code negotiated changes. This was a simplification, as changes in
form might be negotiated in discourse in a different way, however,
for present purposes, we restricted negotiated instances to the
“like-complement” cases. Abrupt changes were taken to be any
change in head noun whose new form was not given in previous
discourse. See Figure 3 for an excerpted transcript of participants
who call a piece “the wrench” repeatedly in the item phase but
shift to calling it “the leg” without overt negotiation.
Participants
Nine pairs of undergraduates participated from the University
of Rochester (N = 18). All participants were native speakers
of American English with normal to corrected vision. None
reported speech or hearing impairments. This study was carried
out in accordance with the Research Subjects Review Board
(RSRB) at the University of Rochester. All participants gave
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki and were debriefed and offered a copy of the consent
form upon completion of the experiment.
Results
Descriptive Data
The following description and analysis includes data from
the nine pairs of participants. The dataset consisted of a
total of 1,776 turns containing referential expressions. These
referential expressions were hand-annotated and then coded for
groundedness. A referential expression was coded as grounded if
it was followed by any of the following agreement markers: mhm,
yup, yeah, yes, okay, or alright. All other referential expressions
were coded as not grounded. A non-grounded expression, if
taken to be a proposal for a name that has not been accepted, is
likely to undergo changes until a name is established. This was not
a change in form that we were interested in, since they would not
be broken pacts. Therefore, we restricted our dataset to grounded
expressions. These made up the subset of data that was used
for the following analyses. Table 2 presents a breakdown of the
number of grounded and changed referential expressions. Note
that when looking at head noun changes generally, they were
quite evenly distributed across groundedness: 50.58% of head
noun changes were grounded. Thus changes were not primarily
the result of a pact not having been formed in the first place.
Analyses
To assess whether a context shift predicted a change of form,
we used a generalized linear mixed model including random
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FIGURE 3 | Transcript of participants referring to a puzzle piece that will become the lion leg in the build phase (Pair 4).
TABLE 2 | Total number of referring expressions.
Total referential expressions Grounded Changed
871 429 173
Note: A subset of the total were grounded, and a subset of the grounded
expressions underwent a change in form (nested values).
intercepts only, with presence of head noun change as the
outcome variable, phase as predictor and pair as a random
effect. The model showed that build phase significantly predicts a
change in form (β= 0.86, SE= 0.13, p< 0.001). Figure 4 presents
the proportion of changes in the two phases.
A second generalized linear model was used to assess how
changes were realized across a task-goal shift. We included
random intercepts and the model contained phase as the
outcome variable, change type (either negotiated or abrupt) as
the predictor and pair was the random effect. The decision
to reverse the directionality of the model from the first was
motivated by the fact that the categories of change type were ad
hoc categories meant to provide a finer-grained description of a
change in form. Thus, we wanted to assess whether occurrences
of a particular type of change could predict whether the pair
was in the item or build phase. Indeed, the model shows that an
occurrence of an abrupt change increases the likelihood that a
pair is in the build phase (β = 0.975, SE = 0.23, p < 0.001). See
Figure 5 for the proportions of abrupt changes for each phase.
Although there were not sufficient trials for a statistical analysis,
we observed a striking phenomenon that further highlights the
context-dependence of names. On 16 trials, one of which is
FIGURE 4 | Proportion of changes in grounded referential expressions
across phases.
illustrated in Figure 3, participants made an abrupt change from
a negotiated name (e.g., wrench) to an object-oriented name
(legs) and then found the piece would not fit. On each of these
trials, participants then reverted to the name used during the
item-phase (e.g., wrench). This illustrates that participants can
shift seamlessly between different names, which reflect different
conceptualizations of the objects tied to different task goals.
Discussion
In Experiment 1, changes in the context were instantiated by
a shift in task goals, i.e., the shift from the item phase to the
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FIGURE 5 | Proportion of abrupt changes in grounded referring
expressions within each phase. Negotiated changes are the converse.
build phase. This allowed us to determine whether a conceptual
pact that was established when the participants had a particular
goal would need to be renegotiated when the goal changed. The
answer was clearly “No,” highlighting that conceptual pacts are
strongly dependent on task goal. We note that an overall task
goal, such as building an animal, is likely to have hierarchically
organized subgoals, e.g., building a part of the animal (e.g., the
face). We are assuming the conversation takes place against the
backdrop of these goals as well as more local subgoals. This
raises the important issue of how local task goals interface with
a conversation as it unfolds. One possibility is that local goals
might play a role in determining the Question Under Discussion
(Roberts, 1996), but this is beyond the scope of the current paper.
In Experiment 2, we examine the extent to which a name
agreed upon in a conceptual pact is entrenched when new objects
are introduced that may potentially change the informational
demands. First, we explore whether negotiation of a name is
predicted from the properties of an object, i.e., whether it
is a commonly identifiable object given the alternatives. This
manipulation was important for two reasons. First, it allowed
us to establish that the typical pattern for negotiated referring
expressions, namely a reduction in length across repeated
references would be replicated in our task. Secondly, increased
negotiation for less identifiable objects would provide evidence
that that object is likely to be more compatible with multiple
descriptions compared to the more identifiable objects. As will
become clear this property of our design creates situations in
which the speaker could generate a referential expression that
would allow them to maintain a lexical precedent.
EXPERIMENT 2: CONCEPTUAL PACTS
AMID EMERGENT NAMING
COMPETITORS
We created a targeted language game (Brown-Schmidt and
Tanenhaus, 2008; Tanenhaus and Brown-Schmidt, 2008)
modeled on puzzles in which a player moves tiles in a constrained
space to match a target pattern. Participants were tasked to move
the tiles collaboratively to achieve the target configuration.
Crucially, three of the tiles were occluded and were only revealed
after they had been moved to a particular location. In the
critical case, an object that could be identified with a name
or a description (e.g., a tangram animal) is occluded and later
revealed, allowing for the establishment of a referring expression
for the already-visible and more prototypical picture (e.g., a
clip art animal). This is contrasted with the reverse order, in
which a prototypical picture is visible and a tangram is revealed.
Adherence to a conceptual pact was assessed by measuring rate
of modification. Unlike in Experiment 1, this set-up calls for the
goal and task structure to remain the same and instead assesses
the effects of potential changes in information demands. In
particular we ask: (1) whether a referential expression for an old
object will be modified after encountering a new object and (2)
whether the frequency of use, or extent to which a name has been
negotiated, affects whether participants continue to use the old
name.
Methods and Materials
The game board consisted of a fixed three by three grid. Each
cell contained a game tile except for the middle cell, which was
empty. Figure 6 presents a sample game board. Tiles can only
be moved into the empty square. Movements into the empty
space were possible only for adjacent tiles (e.g., it was invalid to
move from top left corner to bottom right corner). The target
configuration required the matching of colors and patterns as
described below.
Animal Cards
Each game tile in the occupied cells contained a depiction of
an individual animal in its center. Half of the cards (i.e., four
of the eight) had depictions that were tangrams, or geometric
figures, that resemble an animal. The other four cards had more-
identifiable clip art animal depictions. To create an image bank of
animal graphics of both types, tangram images were used as a base
and modified in an image editor by “photo-shopping” in clip-
art details to create the more identifiable versions, maintaining
color and size consistency in the process. The full image bank
consists of 14 animals each with two versions: tangram and clip-
art/modified. These are hereafter referred to as potential naming
competitors. Figure 6 shows this mix of item types in a sample
game board and Figure 7 illustrates side-by-side comparison of
image type. This feature of the game emerged from a starting
observation: it is unclear to what degree the entrenchment of
a name depends on properties of an object. That is, if partners
collaboratively form a conceptual pact to refer to an object by a
specific name, the process by which that name is agreed upon
might be different depending on the identifiability of the object.
By adding tangram versions of items in this game, we created
a condition where those objects were not only likely to require
more negotiation to establish a name, but could be referred to in
different ways due to not being good exemplars of a particular
animal.
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FIGURE 6 | Game board with four tangram images and four clip art
images.
Two-Player Adaptation
This game was adapted for two people in the following ways.
First, players only have visual access to their own individual
game board. They sit face to face with their partners, but each
has a computer screen the other cannot see. Secondly, players
must play together but make move in alternating order, with
one player making a move and instructing her partner to do the
same and vice versa. Crucially, each player’s game board only
has partial information of what is needed to achieve the target
configuration: both players’ game tiles have the same animal
depiction, but there is also accompanying card information that
is either displayed in the form of a color bar or a pattern bar,
above or below the central animal. There are three possibilities:
Color bars could be red, blue or purple; pattern bars could
be stripes, dots, or stars. Furthermore, these bars appear in
complementary relation. For example, if Player A’s chicken has
a red bar on top, Player B’s chicken might have stars. Any other
animal with a red bar for that game would have a counterpart
with stars. Players do not know which color corresponds to
which pattern, so they are likely to refer to a game tile by
the shared information, i.e., the animal name. Furthermore,
displays for both players were mirror images to allow for
the same moves while discouraging location-based referring
expressions.
In sum, then, the participants’ task was to configure the three
corresponding red/star animals in one row, the three blue/dots in
another and the two purple/stripes in the last row, with the exact
configuration left up to the players.
Occluded Tiles
As described above, eight tiles had animal images, but only a
subset was visible from the start of the game. In particular, three
of the eight tiles initially were hidden by an opaque colored
square that covered the animal and color/pattern information.
These occluded tiles were revealed when they were moved to
the (empty) middle square. Once the occluded tile was moved
to the center, the game tile was revealed and remained visible
throughout the rest of the game. Of most importance, for the
critical game, two of the occluded game tiles covered animal
images that were potential naming competitors to animals on
the game board: one was a hidden tangram version, the other
a hidden clip-art version. The third occluded tile covered a
singleton animal to discourage participants from becoming aware
that there might be a tangram/clip-art contingency. This allowed
for participants to establish names for the visible objects before
encountering an alternative that might plausibly be treated as
a contrast. More specifically, it created a situation in which a
tangram object that after negotiation had been called “the camel”
might be moved, and thus referred to, several times before a more
prototypical camel is revealed. This set up allowed us to address
FIGURE 7 | Side by side comparison of tangram and clip art animals. A subset of six is shown.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 April 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 561
fpsyg-07-00561 April 25, 2016 Time: 14:53 # 8
Ibarra and Tanenhaus The Flexibility of Conceptual Pacts
three questions within the context of an unscripted interaction
among naïve participants.
The first question is to what extent a name remains entrenched
after a new referent is introduced that could be conceptualized as
a contrast to a previously named referent. If the introduction of
a naming competitor results in a modification to an established
name, this suggests a new conceptualization of the original
object, and more importantly, the flexibility of a conceptual
pact to accommodate new contextual information. The second
question is whether the type of competitor would predict
the likelihood of modification. That is, if the revealed object
were a tangram, would its name likely be negotiated to a
common name without appeal to a contrast set? Similarly,
would a hidden clip-art image elicit more modification given
that its name is more commonly shared? The third question
is whether the name for an object becomes more entrenched
with repeated use, i.e., whether it becomes more resistant to
modification.
Conditions
Each pair played a total of two games. The first game had all
singleton items with no naming competitors occluded or visible.
The second game had the crucial occluded tiles covering the
tangram and clip art counterparts to visual tiles, as well as a
singleton.
To manipulate the relative strength of a conceptual pact we
presented the three conditions to also assess carryover across each
game, as follows. Game 1 contained all singleton items. Game 2,
on the other hand, had counterpart items as well as potential carry
over from Game 1. The reason for only including singleton items
in Game 1 was to prevent participants from beginning Game 2
with the assumption that occluded tiles might contain potential
contrast items.
In the No Carryover condition: Game 1 had no items that
carried over to Game 2.
In the Carryover Strong condition: Game 1 had two singleton
items that carried over to Game 2. In Game 2, these singletons
were visible and their naming competitors, never before seen, are
occluded. This was to encourage a strong conceptual pact for the
name given in Game 1.
In the Carryover Mediated condition: Game 1 was identical to
Game 1 of Carryover Strong condition. The same two singleton
items carried over to Game 2, however, the items previously seen
were the naming competitors that were occluded. They were only
revealed later in the game. This is designed to test for reuse of
common names for different referents at the start of Game 2.
Annotations for all token referential expressions were
isolated and coded for length of expression in number of
words, modification (presence/absence), negotiation (presence/
absence), naming competitor status (had competitor/did not),
ordering (hidden/visible). One pair’s Game 1 was not included
in the analysis due to a technical error: recording of the Game 2
dialog erased the recording of the Game 1 dialog.
Participants
Fifteen pairs of participants were recruited from the University
of Rochester (n = 30). All participants were native speakers
of American or British English with normal to corrected
vision. None reported speech or hearing impairments. One
participant reported color-blindness. This study was carried out
in accordance with the RSRB at the University of Rochester. All
participants gave written informed consent in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki and were debriefed and offered a
copy of the consent form upon completion of the experiment.
Speech was recorded and transcribed as a full corpus similar to
Experiment 1.
Results
For purposes of the analyses reported here, we collapsed across
the three “carryover” conditions. In follow-up work with more
pairs, we will examine the effects of these conditions. There were
1671 total referential expressions referring to the animals on the
game cards. References to the occluded squares and location-
based references to the game cards were omitted from the count.
Both occluded squares and location-based references were often
referred to with modification (e.g., “the green occluded,” “the
bottom middle,” respectively), which would artificially increase
the modification rates of interest. The latter were omitted
also because these references had different referents for each
partner. Because game boards were displayed as mirror images,
participants who used location-based references were often likely
to miscommunicate and would only realize later in the game that
their partner was not moving the same card she moved. These
occurred rarely, except for one pair who did not understand the
goal of the game and used these references extensively in Game 1.
Negotiation
Tangram objects were more likely to have names that required
negotiation than others. Of the 113 referential expressions that
were negotiated, 91.2% were tangrams. See Figure 8 for a sample
of a transcript illustrating one instance of negotiation for a
tangram animal but no negotiation for a clip-art animal. In
order to measure the strength of association between item type
(i.e., whether a card was a tangram or a clip-art graphic) and
negotiation status (i.e., a binary yes or no), we used a logistic
regression model with negotiation as the outcome variable and
item type as a predictor. Results indicate that tangrams have
11.31: 1 odds of negotiation relative to clip-art items (Wald-
statistic = 7.24, p < 0.0001), with the overall model significant
(p< 0.0001).
Length of Referring Expression
To assess changes in referring expression, we first measured
length of referring expression. We asked whether the utterances
in our tasks exhibit the standard behavior of repeated reference
in past studies (e.g., Carroll, 1980; Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986;
Brennan and Clark, 1996). As interlocutors converge on a name,
subsequent references should become shorter. Figure 9 shows
the average length of the first three references to an object with
a competitor prior to the reveal of its competitor. A significant
difference of length is shown between clip art and tangram items
on the first reference but by the third reference, the average length
of referring expression for both item types has converged to one
word (e.g., a bare noun). We fit a generalized linear model with
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 April 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 561
fpsyg-07-00561 April 25, 2016 Time: 14:53 # 9
Ibarra and Tanenhaus The Flexibility of Conceptual Pacts
FIGURE 8 | Transcript of participants playing tangram/clip-art game (Pair 6). Negotiated vs. non-negotiated name use.
FIGURE 9 | Average number of words for the first three references
prior to the reveal of a new referent.
length as the outcome and item type and reference number as
the predictor. There was a main effect of both item type and
reference number: tangrams were found more likely to have
longer lengths overall (β = 0.723, SE = 0.2843, p < 0.05), and
crucially, as references increased, length decreased (β=−0.4539,
SE= 0.1846, p< 0.05).
Next, we assessed length of referring expression before and
after the reveal. After the reveal of a competitor item, one
might see a similar reduction of the length of the referring
expression, indicating further convergence on a name. However,
if a participant conceptualizes the revealed object as a contrast
item, the length of the referring expression might plateau or
even increase. We did a contingency analysis for items with
a potential contrast and fit a generalized linear model with
length as the outcome and item type and before-and-after reveal
status as predictors. There was no main effect of item type
(p = 0.13) but a main effect for reveal status. That is, for both
clip art and tangram objects there was an increase in length
after the reveal of a potential contrast (β = 0.7065, SE = 0.2462,
p < 0.01). Figure 10 shows the average length of referring
expression for the single reference before and after the reveal of
its competitor.
Length around the reveal of a non-specific item (i.e., an item
that is not a competitor) was also assessed. Figure 11 shows
the average length of referring expressions for items that would
eventually have a competitor, before and after an item was
revealed that did not have a potential contrast, which we will term
a non-specific item. These non-specific reveals occurred prior
to the specific competitor reveal. For clip art items, there is no
increase in length, and for tangram items, there is a numerical but
non-significant increase. This suggests that the increase in length
is particular to a potential contrast and not a new object in the
display. We next assess whether this increase in length could be
explained by modification.
Modification
Modification: base rate
Base rate modification was low overall, with 22.4% of the 1671
references having modified referential expressions. Of the 374
modified referential expressions, 62.8% were tangrams, regardless
of whether a naming competitor was present in the visual display.
Looking at Game 1 only, the modification rate across all item
types was 28.3%. For Game 2, the modification rate for those
items without a naming competitor was 17.4%, but this rose to
54.3% when the items had a potential naming competitor.
Modification: before and after reveal
As stated above, there were three types of items that were
occluded: a tangram with an occluded clip-art competitor, a
clip-art with an occluded tangram competitor, and an occluded
singleton. The proportion of modification for all competitor
items before its competitor was introduced was 19.6%, whereas
the proportion of modification for competitor items after its
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FIGURE 10 | Average number of words in referring expression before
and after a specific competitor item was revealed.
FIGURE 11 | Average number of words in referring expression before
and after a non-specific item was revealed.
competitor was introduced was 53.2%. See Figure 12 for an
excerpt of a transcript in which an item previously unmodified
is modified after the reveal of the naming competitor. Breaking
down the data by item type, tangrams were modified 31.3%
before the reveal and 69.4% after the reveal. Clip art images were
modified 6.7% before the reveal and 35.8% after the reveal.
The crucial question was whether aspects of the revealed
competitor affected entrenchment of a conceptual pact. Looking
only at those occluded items with competitors, we used a
generalized linear mixed regression model to measure the extent
to which item type, number of “before-the-reveal” references, and
order of reveal predicts modification. We used modification as
the outcome variable and included four predictors: reveal state
(i.e., before or after the reveal), item type (tangram or clip art),
order of competitor reveal (whether tangram or clip-art was the
occluded item), and number of “before” references. A random
effect of pair was also included in the model. We introduced
both random intercepts and slopes and removed one at a time
until the model converged. The model shows that “before-the-
reveal” references were less likely to be modified than “after-the
reveal” references (β=−2.06, SE= 0.43, p< 0.001). In addition,
tangrams were more likely to be modified (β = 1.57, SE = 0.24,
p < 0.001) than clip art images. However, neither the order of
the reveal nor the number of “before-the-reveal” references was
significant (β = −0.45, SE = 0.31, p = 0.15 and β = −0.07,
SE = 0.09, p = 0.48, respectively). Crucially, then, the pressure
to maintain a lexical precedent for the clip art image, which
was a better fit to the established name, was not sufficient to
lead interlocutors to choose a non-contrastive description for the
potential tangram competitor.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 show that conceptual pacts are easily
broken when information demands change, even when names
have been negotiated and used multiple times. We found clear
evidence that names converge and reduce in form with repeated
references, replicating previous results. Convergence was noted
for both tangram and clip art images suggesting that despite
differences in goodness of fit, the naming process was similar.
Initial references to tangrams were longer than initial references
to clip art images. However, by the third reference, both had
converged to the length of a bare noun. The surprising result is
that length increases equally for both the tangram objects and the
clip art objects after the reveal of a specific competitor, suggesting
a breaking of the conceptual pact, even when for a tangram-reveal
the speaker might have chosen a name that did not change the
name of previously mentioned clip art.
The increase in length was corroborated by an increase in
modification. However, there was a higher modification rate
overall for tangram objects than clip art. This asymmetry suggests
that the images have different goodness of fit with the presumed
negotiated name. Accordingly, these images are not obvious
contrasts with each other, but could still be conceptualized
as such. Although the overall modification rate is higher for
tangram objects, both objects are modified after the reveal,
and crucially the effect of introducing a potential competitor
on modification is not contingent on a particular order of
reveal. Thus, modification, here, was tied more closely to
competitor presence than the type of competitor. Furthermore,
the number of references made prior to the reveal did not predict
modification, suggesting that frequency of use of a name is
not associated with that name becoming more entrenched. This
supports a strongly context-dependent view of conceptual pacts,
one in which pacts are flexible enough to accommodate as a new
conceptualization of an object, which may occur at any point in
the interaction.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
A conceptual pact has historically been framed as a temporary
agreement between interlocutors to not only refer to objects by a
particular name but also to adopt a particular conceptualization
of the referent (Brennan and Clark, 1996). Although Brennan
and Clark (1996) emphasized the temporary, context-specific
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FIGURE 12 | Transcript of participants modifying referential expressions for both camels in Game 2, despite using common name in Game 1 (Pair 7).
nature of conceptual pacts, that claim had not been well-
established in the literature. In fact the focus on the costs of
breaking a lexical precedent suggested that there are strong
pressures for interlocutors to maintain a conceptual pacts. To
evaluate the context-dependence of conceptual pacts we created
conversational interactions in which either the task goals or
the potential information demands of the referential domain
changed. We asked whether interlocutors would maintain pacts
when the local context changes. We found little or no evidence
that interlocutors felt bound by names, even negotiated names,
when there was a change in these contextual features.
Experiment 1 focused on the extent to which conceptual pacts
are bound to specific task goals. We used a puzzle paradigm to
elicit unscripted references to objects across different goals with a
single partner. Furthermore, we designed the experiment to elicit
multiple references to objects in order to assess the possibility of
naming changes over time. The variable of interest was not only
whether changes occurred but, if so, how they occurred. That
is, would a new name for an object require renegotiation? Or
would the new context created by the change in the goal structure,
from identifying abstract pieces to using those pieces to build
an animal, result in abrupt changes in referential descriptions?
Indeed, we found that conceptual pacts were easily abandoned
when switching from a phase of a game that required identifying
single pieces to a phase that involved assembling those pieces
into an identifiable animal. Participants were likely to change a
name that was already grounded. Even further, they were likely
to change that name to an animal-based name abruptly without
negotiation. Moreover, interlocutors would return to the previous
negotiated name when the action based on the animal-based
reference was unsuccessful, i.e., when the parts assumed to be a
leg would not fit.
Experiment 2 focused on the degree to which names are
entrenched in the face of changing referential alternatives. In this
experiment, change was explored more narrowly by measure of
length of referential expression and, specifically, modification to
an established name. Modification has been shown to be a way
of lexically marking contrast in a referential domain (e.g., Nadig
and Sedivy, 2002; Sedivy, 2003; Engelhardt et al., 2006; Brown-
Schmidt and Tanenhaus, 2006; Brown-Schmidt and Konopka,
2008). And importantly, it connects back to the original work
on conceptual pacts (Brennan and Clark, 1996), which used
over-modification as a way of determining adherence to a name
established in the presence of a contrast set. One example is
calling particular footwear in an array “a dress shoe” in the
presence of other types of shoes and then maintaining this
over-specific form when encountering the object in an array
where there are no other shoes. This is taken as evidence that
conceptual pacts are maintained (i.e., names are entrenched)
despite the change in visual context. However, over-modification
is often taken to be more acceptable in conversation as under-
modification for various reasons (see e.g., Isaacs and Clark, 1987;
Pogue et al., 2016), which reduces the strong claim that name
entrenchment and conceptual pacts are creating pressures to use
overly specific forms.
Experiment 2 used a targeted language game to create
a situation where participants used a name, negotiated or
otherwise, and then were presented with an item that may or
may not be viewed as a member of a contrast set. This allowed
us to examine the degree to which conceptual pacts become
strengthened by increased repetition, thereby becoming more
resistant to modification. We chose images (i.e., tangrams) that
have precedent in language studies of reference and conceptual
pacts. However, our modifications to the images allowed us to
present a “naming competitor” that is not simply semantically
similar but might better fit a common name already grounded.
This asymmetry in fit allowed for either option to occur in
conceptualization: participants could view them as pairs of a
contrast set or choose not to given that one is a better exemplar.
Visual similarity helped us avoid objects that might be contrasted
by use of a prenominal adjective along a dimension such as size
or color. Instead, we saw modifications like “the real camel”
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and “the origami camel.” By occluding some objects including
potential competitors, we were able to create conditions where
the number of uses of a name, both those that were negotiated
and those that were accepted without negotiation, varied as a
natural consequence of how the dialog unfolded. As expected,
introducing a possible contrast increased modification rates for
referential descriptions of objects that had been referred to
previously. Somewhat surprisingly, though, was that there was no
effect of number of mentions on modification rates. This suggests
that even if repeated mention might strengthen a conceptual pact,
the effect is not strong enough to affect how a new object will be
conceptualized, which would be the case if the conceptual pact
were resistant to modification.
Taken together the results suggest that interlocutors choose
names that are highly dependent upon local task goals and
informational demands, and these names can change rapidly as
different aspects of the context change. One the one hand, this
is not surprising. Use of referring expressions is highly fluid, as
indexed by the many to many mappings that can be observed in
repeated references to objects in a discourse. On the other hand,
the fact that pacts are so fluid is surprising. We find strikingly
little support for any effects of repetition of a name. Once the
context changes, the referring expression is determined with
respect to that context.
These results suggest that it will be important to embed
investigations of reference generation and understanding in
richer dialogs where it is possible to investigate the effects of
complex goal structures in conversation. Also, incorporating
dynamic referential domains in a given interaction that allows
for a reconceptualization of alternative objects will help us
further understand how goals and naming alternatives influence
one another. Targeted language games provide a promising
methodological approach for pursuing these investigations.
These results also have implications for computational models
of reference generation. For example, existing models have
focused on the grounding process (e.g., Heeman and Hirst,
1995), but have not taken into account the temporary nature
of the conceptual pacts that are created during grounding.
Thus small changes in a local goal might result in abrupt
changes to previously grounded expressions. Moreover, evidence
for miscommunication might result in returning to referential
expressions that were tied to previous goals. There is also a
tradition of modeling reference generation and understanding,
building on classic work by Dale and Reiter (1995) as an
incremental process that takes into account the objects in the
referential domain, including the salience of their properties. But
what objects are in the referential domain and what properties
are salient will be highly fluid and strongly determined by shifting
goals.
It is useful here to consider an analogy to work in vision in
natural tasks. There is a tradition of modeling shifts in attention
to regions of a scene as indexed by using properties such as
visual salience derived by integrating multiple feature values at
each position within a scene (i.e., saliency maps; see Koch and
Ullman, 1985). Moreover, these models correlate with fixation
probabilities during viewing of a scene when the observer is
not given a particular task. As reviewed by Hayhoe and Ballard
(2005, also see Salverda et al., 2011), however, feature-based
salience turns out to be a poor predictor of gaze patterns when
a participant is engaged in a well-defined task and needs to
derive certain information from the visual input to successfully
complete the task.
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